

# Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons

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Most views of agency take acting for reasons (whether explanatory or justifying) to be an important hallmark of the capacity for agency. The problem, however, is that the standard analysis of what it is to act in light of reasons is not sufficiently fine grained to accommodate what we will argue are the myriad *types* of ways that agents can do so. We suggest that a full account of acting for reasons must also recognize *the relationship that agents have with their reasons*. We focus on two types of relationships. The first is the traditional case, where agents act in light of reasons that they take to be their own and that they endorse. We describe this as possessing an Endorsement Relationship with one's reasons. A second way of relating to reasons is what we will describe as possessing a Directed Relationship with one's reasons. This includes cases in which agents' actions are the product of reasons but toward which agents do not have an Endorsement Relationship. The Endorsement Relationship is uncontroversial. In this paper, we defend the existence and importance of the Directed Relationship. We show that it is a genuine but overlooked way of relating to, and thereby acting for, reasons.

## KEYWORDS

acting for reasons, agency, intentional action, reasons

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

There have been numerous accounts of the capacities necessary and sufficient for agency, as well as the necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action. Here is one useful way of distinguishing among them. First, there are those who endorse Davidson's (2001a/1963, 2001b/1971) causal theory of action. Second, there are those who reject it. However, it is striking that both camps agree on one aspect of agency: creatures that are agents are (among other things) capable of forming intentions to

act on the basis of reasons (Anscombe, 1957; Brand, 1984; Bratman, 1999, pp. 26–29, p. 111; Hornsby, 2007; Korsgaard, 2008, p. 13; Mele, 1992; Paul, 2009; Setiya, 2007, pp. 30–36, but compare with p. 40; Velleman, 2000, pp. 197–99).<sup>1</sup> Naturally, not all views of intentional agency take the causal theory of action to be correct nor do they take acting for reasons to be the only distinctive characteristic of agency. Still, most nonetheless take the capacity to act for reasons to be one of the *hallmarks* of agency, even if it is not its only or main distinctive feature.<sup>2</sup> While we agree that this is one of the hallmarks of agency, we believe the standard analysis of the capacity to act for reasons is not sufficiently fine grained to capture the vagaries of everyday human action. We will argue that room must be made to accommodate the myriad *types of ways* that agents can act for reasons.

We suggest that a full account of acting for reasons must also recognize *the relationship that agents have with their reasons*. We focus on two types of relationships. The first is the traditional case, where agents act in light of reasons that they take to be their own and that they endorse. We describe this as possessing an Endorsement Relationship with one's reasons. A second way of acting for reasons is what we will describe as possessing a Directed Relationship with one's reasons. As detailed below, this second way of acting for reasons includes cases in which agents' actions are the product of reasons but toward which the agents do not have an Endorsement Relationship. The Endorsement Relationship is uncontroversial. It is the second type of relationship (which we will argue is a genuine but overlooked way of acting for reasons) that we will defend in this paper.

The plan for the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we survey the available resources for explaining the various ways agents can act for reasons. In Section 3, we then show that if we shift our focus to the various relationships agents can have with their reasons, we can produce a comparably fine-grained analysis of the ways that agents act for reasons. We identify what we call the Consideration Relationship that agents have with their reasons, of which there are (at least) two types. Namely, what we described above: (1) the Endorsement Relationship and (2) the Directed Relationship. The first of these two types of Consideration Relationship captures the traditional (and, notably, idealized) case of acting for reasons discussed above; it is the second type that, we suggest, captures a range of ways that agents can act for reasons without reaching the conditions set by the idealized case. From these two modes of relating to reasons, it follows that there are (at least) two ways of acting for reasons. We then connect our argument in this paper to our previous work (Arruda & Povinelli, 2016), where we outlined the ways in which non-human animals might be understood as acting for reasons. We conclude by replying to a set of objections (Section 4), and we briefly sketch how a modified version of the current account lays the foundation for showing that non-human animals (specifically chimpanzees) may also be capable of having a range of ways of relating to and acting for reasons (Section 5).

## 2 | RELATING TO AND ACTING FOR REASONS: A SURVEY AND A PROBLEM

Broadly speaking, acting for a reason involves an agent's capacity to identify, consider, and endorse a consideration as her reason for action, where the reason in question can be either motivating or

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<sup>1</sup> These accounts do so on a variety of different grounds and often understand what "acting for a reason" constitutes in diverging ways. Some, such as Hornsby (2007), argue that there are different senses of acting for a reason in that reasons can be used to explain actions as kinds of events and yet fail to be the reasons that agents take to be their own.

<sup>2</sup> This is also the case for what are often called teleological theories of intentional action (Sehon, 2005; Wilson, 1989), volitional theories (Ginet, 1990; Wallace, 2006a, 2006b), as well as those that take agents' guidance of (or relationship to) their actions to be essential for intentional action (Frankfurt, 1978, 1998/1971; Hornsby, 2004 but compare with 2007; Velleman, 2000, p. 199).

justifying. But are all cases of acting for a reason in our everyday lives going to fall under this broad umbrella? We do not think so.

As diverse as they are, the existing approaches to articulating what constitutes acting for a reason share a similar (and, we believe, narrow) view of the relationship that agents must have with their reasons. Call this relationship the Consideration Relationship. A natural place to begin is with Davidson's (2001a/1963) causal theory of action and many of its contemporary analogues (e.g., Mele, 1992; Mele & Moser, 1994). Although Davidson proposes the necessary and sufficient conditions for an action to be intentional, his view also entails a picture of what constitutes acting for a reason. According to the causal theory, actions are intentional just in case agents act for reasons, thereby omitting the need for a theory of how agents will or author their actions. Here "act for reasons" can mean a wide range of things, but a simple way of understanding it takes an agent to act for reasons just in case she possesses the relevant belief–desire pair, or reason, to undertake the action in question or for the end the action brings about. Some, though certainly not all, alterations to the causal theory to account for the problem of causal deviance often add that agents must have the *appropriate* relationship to their reasons<sup>3</sup> rather than merely possessing the relevant belief–desire pairs but not taking them to be reasons.<sup>4</sup> Taken together, we can say that the causal theory of action accepts that an agent has acted for a reason when she has a belief–desire pair that is suitably related to the action and she takes that belief–desire pair to be the consideration *in light of* which she is acting.

Volitional theories, best exemplified by Frankfurt's (1978, 1998/1971), Ginet's (1990) and Wallace's (2006a, 2006b) respective accounts, differ in their account of intentional action, but they share a similar view of what it means to act for a reason. These views make the Consideration Relationship more explicit than the typical Davidsonian view.<sup>5</sup> On these views, broadly speaking, I act for a reason just in case I have (or counterfactually could have) endorsed a consideration as one that I want to guide my actions.<sup>6</sup> In short, I recognize the consideration as *my* reason for willing a particular course of action.

This basic account of one's relationship to reasons is not tied, however, to any particular view of agency. Consider a different view of agency that shares this view of the Consideration Relationship. For constitutivists (e.g., Korsgaard, 1996, 2009, pp. 98–99, pp. 174–175; Velleman, 2009, pp. 124, 189), an agent acts for a reason when she takes that consideration to be one that she wants to define (or "constitute") the kind of agent that she wants to become. Although different constitutivists present different pictures of the process of self-constitution, the upshot of their accounts *qua* a theory of acting for reasons is the same—namely, that one necessary condition is that agents must have an explicit relationship with their reasons *as reasons* (see Korsgaard, 2008, p. 13; Velleman, 2000, pp. 197–199).

We find a similar view of acting for reasons even in a cursory evaluation of teleological accounts (Sehon, 2005; Wilson, 1989) and the planning theory of agency (Bratman, 2007a, pp. 140–142).

<sup>3</sup> Even Davidson (2001c/1973, pp. 78–80), in his discussion of the infamous climber case, notes that reasons must cause actions in the "right kind of way" in order to count as cases of intentional actions. We might suppose that he had in mind something like the condition that one takes one's reasons as one's own (See also Schlosser 2012, p.291–291). Naturally, there are solutions to this problem that *do not* include this condition (for example, Hornsby (2007), Hyman (2014), Peacocke (1979) and Smith (2012)). However, the fact that some solutions do not include this condition in no way entails any substantive conclusions regarding the motivation for our argument here. Our only point is that *one illustration* of the tendency to take self-reflectively acting for reasons to be a hallmark of agency can be found in *some* solutions to the problem of causal deviance.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Brand (1984, p. 23), Chisholm (1966, pp. 29–30), Frankfurt (1978), Hyman (2014), Mele (2003), Mele and Moser (1994 pp. 41–43); Peacocke (1979), Schlosser (2007, p. 189; 2012)), Searle (1983, p. 82) and Smith (2012).

<sup>5</sup> This difference is best understood by the Davidsonian view's susceptibility to the problem of causal deviance.

<sup>6</sup> These three volitional views are different, but they share a similar view about what constitutes acting for a reason.

Both take acting for reasons to require that we act *in light of* some consideration even while defending significantly different views of the hallmarks of agency and, in particular, of intentional action.<sup>7</sup>

In this regard, we can see that strikingly different views of intentional agency share a roughly similar view of what it means to act for a reason. Specifically, they are united in the view that agents stand in what we have called a Consideration Relationship to their reasons. But they are also united in how they implicitly understand the nature of this relationship—an understanding that we will make explicit and ultimately deny as the only way to explain how agents relate to their reasons.<sup>8</sup> Although this view of acting for reasons is only part of the story, we believe it is shorthand for a set of unstated conditions that should be unpacked in order to evaluate the overall picture. Namely, the Standard Consideration Relationship View argues that an agent acts for reasons under the following necessary and sufficient conditions:

1. The Explicitness Condition: The agent in question has (or counterfactually could have, given other facts about this particular agent in this actual world) an explicit, or self-aware, relationship to her reasons as her own.<sup>9</sup>
2. The Self-Conscious Understanding Condition: An agent understands (either dispositionally or as a matter of propositional knowledge) reasons *as* reasons in favor of the action she is intending to undertake, regardless of the actual justificatory status of the reasons.
3. The Deliberation Condition: The reasons in question are the product of or figure in deliberation, when deliberation occurs.

Let us consider each of these conditions in turn.

First, the intuition behind the Standard Consideration Relationship View is that agents have a self-conscious relationship with the considerations (or reasons) that they take to motivate and likely to justify their action, which is represented by (1) above. Naturally, however, we are not always in this relationship in such explicit terms. With this in mind, this condition simply requires that we are in a position to recollect our reasons upon initiating the process of explicitly considering what we are doing or have done. On the other hand, this condition is not so weak as to specify that it must merely be possible to discover our reasons. Rather, this condition specifies that it must be genuinely possible for us to do so in this actual world, given our epistemic, cognitive and motivational strengths and limitations. More importantly, this process is not a matter of discovery. Instead, it is something akin to the process of recollection or self-reflection.

Consider the following case, which we take to illustrate this complicated feature of The Explicitness Condition. Jane, a well-known author, is working on a new novel. One day, as she is sitting at her desk working on a chapter, she has a new idea for a plot twist. The idea sounds good to her, and she makes a note to try to add this new twist to the end of the chapter that she is currently writing. Later in the week, Jane looks at her notes for how to end her current chapter and returns to her note for the plot twist. Jane says to herself, “Wow, what a terrible idea. It doesn't work with the overall

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<sup>7</sup> Here, the teleological account may not directly appeal to the idea that agents act *in light of* reasons, at least because they take agents to engage in intentional action *in order to* bring about a certain kind of end. But it is hard to describe “*in order to*” claims without also citing *at least* instrumental reasons that agents must cite for taking one path to obtaining their ends over others. They do act *in light of* those instrumental reasons, given that they are pursuing some end rather than another. Similarly, even if this type of view takes our ability to set ends to be fundamental to our capacity for agency, its proponents surely do not deny that acting in light of reasons figures in the setting of those ends.

<sup>8</sup> For a view that makes an explicit claim about what it means for an agent to “take” a consideration as a reason (and how this might be used to understand acting for reasons), see Schlosser 2012.

<sup>9</sup> The awareness can take a dispositional form.

trajectory of the plot at all. What could I have been thinking?" Here, a good response that she is likely to give to herself is something akin to the following: "Oh, right, it sounded good at the time and it seemed to add a surprise to the plot that would engage the reader." Here, Jane demonstrates her ability, given what she knows about her writing habits and her own literary insights while writing, to understand what tends to motivate her. Whether Jane actually has this response is irrelevant.<sup>10</sup> What counts for the Consideration Relationship is that she could have done so given the kind of agent that she is in this actual world (but not necessarily in any or even in any close possible worlds).

Condition (2), or The Self-Conscious Understanding Condition, specifies that agents must not only relate to their reasons in a self-conscious fashion, but they must also understand those considerations *as* reasons. On this condition, agents must understand their reasons to represent considerations in favor of the action that they are undertaking.<sup>11</sup> This underscores the particular kind of relationship agents must have with their reasons on a standard picture.

Finally, condition (3) specifies that *when an agent engages in deliberation* about an action, the reason that turns out to play a role in her ultimate decision should also have played a role in her deliberations. This condition further underscores that, on the standard picture, the particular kind of relationship agents must have with their reasons requires that agents explicitly understand their reasons as such (McDowell, 2009).

Conditions (1)–(3) do not produce an incorrect view about relating to and acting for reasons.<sup>12</sup> The main question is whether this is the *only* way to act for reasons. A second question is whether this is the most empirically common way in which human agents do so. As will become apparent, we think that both questions should be answered in the negative.

## 2.1 | Why these accounts are not sufficiently fine grained (and why we should care)

There are myriad reasons why these questions are significant. First, while accounts of acting for reasons typically distinguish among different kinds of reasons (say, the difference between merely motivating and genuinely justifying reasons), they do not distinguish between the various ways that agents *can relate to those reasons*. Second, the reason that we ought to distinguish among the various ways that agents can relate to their reasons is that we lay the foundation for providing a more fine-grained account of human agency.<sup>13</sup> To see why this latter issue is particularly pressing, consider two types of actions that action theorists have difficulty fully explaining, given their account of relating to (and acting for) reasons as outlined in the previous section:

- i. Actions that constitute either less than "full-blooded" expressions of the capacity for agency or what some philosophers, such as Peter Railton (2009, p. 81), call instances of "fluent" agency<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Compare with Schlosser (2012, pp.285-ff.)

<sup>11</sup> This is not a claim about the nature of reasons: it is unnecessary, for our purposes, to determine whether reasons are belief–desire pairs or facts of the matter.

<sup>12</sup> In fact, these conditions complement a type of action that we have called Reason-Considered Action (Arruda & Povinelli, 2016).

<sup>13</sup> Here, we assume that our account is more fine grained in the sense that a fully developed human agent will, *in principle*, be capable of exhibiting the full range of ways of relating to and acting for reasons that we discuss. But this does not entail that one *must* actually exercise one's capacities in this full range of ways in order to count either as an agent or as capable of acting for reasons. On a related note, what this range looks like in different species may be different than, while sharing some similarities with, this basic range.

<sup>14</sup> Another way of understanding (i) is in terms of Dreyfus (2007a, 2007b) and McDowell's (2007a, 2007b, 2009) debate concerning the conceptual underpinnings of perception and motor intentionality. See also McDowell's (2009) claim that we can count as responding to reasons, without responding to reasons "as such," just in case we have the right kind of perceptual responses to the relevant information. Broadly speaking, this set of debates concerns the relationship between the reflective and pre-reflective aspects of human action. While our interests in this paper are related to the question of which aspects of our actions are reflective and which are pre-

ii. Actions that are (a) merely purposive (or goal-directed) or (b) skilled<sup>15</sup>

Any account of human agency will grant that these phenomena occupy an important place in the everyday lives of human agents. The problem, as we show below, is that these phenomena are *not* “non-actions,” and yet, at the same time, they also do not fulfill the conditions outlined in the Standard Consideration Relationship View. As a result, it is difficult to classify them as actions-done-for-reasons.<sup>16</sup>

To see how so, let us consider examples of (i) and (ii) in terms of whether they meet the conditions for the Standard Consideration Relationship View. Beginning with (i), any theory of human agency must grant that the capacity for agency can express itself in a variety of ways, many of which fall below an idealized picture of what constitutes exercising this capacity. Many philosophers acknowledge this basic point (Bratman, 1984, 1999, esp. pp. 26–29, p. 52, p. 111, 2007b, p. 63; Butterfill, 2001; Di Nucci, 2014, p. 9; Kalis, 2011, p. 115; Korsgaard, 1996, 2008, esp. p. 13, 2009, pp. 98–99, pp. 159–176, 2011, 2012, 2013; ms.; Nussbaum, 2006, p. 133; Sebo, 2017; Velleman, 2000, esp. p. 176, pp. 187–189, pp. 191–199). Yet when we try to capture this “variety of expression” in the context of specific capacities, such as the capacity to act for reasons, a problem arises.<sup>17</sup> The distinction between kinds of reasons—that is, between motivating and justifying reasons—does not seem to capture the necessary variety. In this regard, there is empirical and conceptual pressure on any account of human agency and, thereby, on what it means to act for reasons to explain these cases.

Taking into account the conditions (1)–(3) for standing in a Consideration Relationship with our reasons for action outlined above (per the Standard Consideration Relationship View), let us ask whether either of the phenomena in (i) will count as actions done for reasons. The less-than-full-blooded exercises of agency may not meet all three conditions for having a Consideration Relationship with one's reasons. This is particularly the case for the Deliberation Condition and perhaps also the Explicitness Condition, depending on the case at hand.<sup>18</sup> To see why, consider the case of Juan, who is going for a leisurely stroll on a weekend morning. Feeling exasperated and antsy, Juan simply got up and went out for a walk. In cases like this, it is not clear that Juan deliberated about going for a stroll in a way that makes these reasons explicit to him. Nor must he have done so in order to engage in the action. At the same time, it is quite clear that Juan had some *nascent* relationship to his reason for going for a stroll, viz., going for a stroll seems an obvious choice for relieving his exasperation and anxiety. Yet this is not a case of full-blooded agency, given that Juan neither explicitly

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reflective, they are by no means equivalent to it. We are not attempting to explain how we can pre-reflectively act intentionally. Rather, we examine *the nature of the relationship* that we have with reasons in those kinds of cases. McDowell's description of his aims (McDowell, 2007a, p. 366) makes this distinction clear: “In other work, I invoked the image of stepping back, with a view to distinguishing rationality in a strong sense—responsiveness to reasons as such—from the kind of responding to reasons that is exemplified by, say, fleeing from danger, which is something non-rational animals can do. The idea was that given the ability to step back, the capacities that are operative in ordinary perceptual engagement with the world, and in ordinary bodily action, belong to a subject's rationality in that strong sense: they are conceptual in the sense in which I claim that our perceptual and active lives are conceptually shaped. When one is unreflectively immersed, one is exactly not exercising the ability to step back. But even so the capacities operative in one's perceiving or acting are conceptual, and their operations are conceptual.” (See also Dreyfus, 2007a, p. 352.)

<sup>15</sup> We do not assume that merely purposive action and skilled action represent the same type of actions. Rather, we suggest that they present a similar *kind of problem* for the Standard Consideration Relationship View.

<sup>16</sup> Di Nucci (2014) makes a parallel claim regarding how standard views of intentional action cannot account fully for “mindless” (or automatic) actions.

<sup>17</sup> We are not the first to raise worries about cases like (i) (e.g., Arpaly & Schroeder, 2012; Doris, 2015, p. 129–ff).

<sup>18</sup> Depending on how Juan frames his relatively spontaneous decision to go for a stroll, he may meet The Self-Conscious Understanding Condition. If he says to himself, “I have to get out of the house. I am so frustrated with the work I am currently doing,” then he probably counts as meeting it. By contrast, if he simply drops his work and says to himself, “I'm getting out of here,” one may think he does not fully meet this condition.

deliberated about whether going for a walk would relieve his anxiety nor did he have this reason in mind when he set out on his walk. Here one may want to claim that he does meet the Self-Conscious Understanding Condition, given that he seems *dispositionally* sensitive to the reason to go for the walk. But notice that he actually did not have a sense of how this reason provides a justification for his taking a walk; rather, taking a walk just “struck” him, as we often say, as the thing to do at that moment. This can occur without any sense of the justificatory force, perceived or actual, of the reason. In fact, all that is required is that taking a stroll struck Juan as being at the “top of the stack” of potentially fitting actions to do at the moment.

Let us now turn to (ii), the cases of merely purposive and skilled actions. Again taking into account the conditions (1)–(3) for standing in a Consideration Relationship with our reasons for action outlined above (per the Standard Consideration Relationship View), it is difficult to see how examples of (ii) will meet these conditions for relating to (and acting for) reasons. Nonetheless, we contend that these cases are types of intentional action where agents bear some relationship with their reasons for action, but it does not qualify as a fully self-conscious relationship.<sup>19,20</sup> To begin, consider “purposive action,” or what philosophers sometimes refer to as *merely* goal-directed action (e.g., Bratman, 2007c, pp. 21–22; Korsgaard, 2011, p. 103). As an example, consider an agent—call him Jones—as he swipes a duster over a shelf while in the process of pursuing his intention to clean the house. Although it is correct to note that these actions (e.g., the controlled movement of the duster) are not the standard case of intentional action, it would be empirically inaccurate to claim that agents have no reasons for what they do in these cases. Still, Jones meets none of the three conditions for the Standard Consideration Relationship. For obvious reasons, he will not meet either the Self-Conscious Understanding Condition or the Deliberation Condition. More importantly, he will not meet the Explicitness Condition unless he receives the relevant kind of prompting concerning his reasons. Of course, a perspicacious observer can always cite Jones' plausible overall goal of cleaning the house as the reason for his action—which he, too, could explicitly cite if he were asked. This fact allows such an observer to conclude that Jones is dusting in part to satisfy this goal, *and further* add that this reason must be present to him in some way. But this highlights the limitations of the Standard Consideration Relationship View for explaining how we relate to (and act for) reasons. If the above description of Jones' goal is correct, it would be wrong to claim that, when the reasons that underpin this goal-directed action are not immediately apparent, Jones has no relationship to his reasons. Yet this is demanded by the Standard Consideration Relationship View.

A parallel case is skilled action, such as that of the professional athlete, musician, artist, and, even, the experienced driver.<sup>21</sup> Like the case of purposive action, many of the actions involved in these activities do not rise to the level of what one directly intends. What distinguishes these actions from purposive actions is that they involve one's specialized skills, which often express themselves in embodied form.<sup>22</sup> Railton (2009, p. 102) describes these actions as having an initial set of

<sup>19</sup> As noted earlier, consider here the *cognate* debate about the nature of embodied cognition and embodied practical reasoning (Dreyfus, 2007a, 2007b; McDowell, 2007a, p. 342, 2007b, p. 349; Rietveld, 2008, 2010) in, especially, skilled action (Brownstein, 2014). Our account could plausibly complement such a view. But, given space constraints, we cannot fully address the relationship here.

<sup>20</sup> A natural question to raise here is whether an account of directed attention would explain these cases. Though an important issue, we do not take it to be directly germane to our concern in this paper. Accounts of directed attention in intentional action, such as Pacherie (2006), tend to use this concept to explain intentions-in-action rather than how agents relate to their reasons for action.

<sup>21</sup> Many purposive actions involve skills, as the aforementioned case of dusting highlights. Here, however, we aim to isolate skilled actions that involve specialized, often habituated and embodied skill sets. We recognize, however, that the distinction between these two kinds of cases of action may be quite fuzzy.

<sup>22</sup> Skilled action represents a slightly different kind of case than merely purposive action. In the former case, we lack the conceptual machinery to explain in what sense these actions are done for reasons *in part because* skilled actions do not require that we make explicit the intermediate actions required to realize the skilled action.

“unpremeditated” or “fluent” intentional actions at their respective cores. But the possibility that they are not directly intended does not entail that they are not done for reasons. Nor does it entail that the agent has no relationship with the reasons in question. Yet the Consideration Relationship (per the Standard Consideration Relationship View) again disqualifies these as cases of relating to (and acting for) reasons because the three conditions are not met. Imagine Jamie the farmer who is picking raspberries in her field. She is sufficiently accustomed to the delicate touch that one must take with each berry and the spines on the plant such that she does not need to remind herself of these considerations in order to approximate the proper amount of force as she pulls each berry from the bush. If one is limited to the Standard Consideration Relationship View outlined above, it is difficult to explain how Jamie relates to and acts for reasons. Perhaps she meets the Explicitness Condition in that she is (at least counterfactually) aware of the reasons she has to harvest her crop and that she ought to do all that she can to avoid bruising it. But what about the other conditions? Even if we were to weaken the requirements for what counts as deliberation in the Deliberation Condition, Jamie's actions would still fail to meet the Self-Conscious Understanding Condition.

Our main point here is twofold. First, the respective actions of Juan, Jones, and Jamie are clearly not cases where agents relate to their reasons for action in the standard way. But this does not entail that they stand in no relation to their reasons whatsoever. Related to this point, their actions, second, are far from those done for no reason whatsoever.<sup>23</sup> We are not the first to note that these cases present special problems for theories of agency. There is a fair amount of literature in both philosophy of mind and action to support the worry about accounting for cases like that of Jamie the farmer (e.g., Dreyfus, 2007a, 2007b; Hurley, 1998; McDowell, 2007a, 2007b; Pacherie, 2011; Rowlands, 2006). Following up on these diverse lines of thought, we argue that there is an additional way of enriching our understanding of human agency to account not only for the cases discussed above but also to provide the resources to explain the empirical diversity found in expressions of human agency. We contend that *broadening and diversifying what it means to relate to reasons will similarly diversify what it means to act for a reason*. If true, this adds an important dimension to the existing set of resources. Thus, the goal for the remaining parts of the paper is to provide a more fine-grained account of what constitutes *relating to* reasons. In so doing, we will conclude with a more fine-grained account of *acting for* reasons that (a) preserves our intuitions about what this looks like in its most developed form, and (b) captures actual agency in its everyday expressions.<sup>24</sup>

### 3 | TWO (AMONG MANY) WAYS OF RELATING TO (AND ACTING FOR) REASONS

In this section, we will examine in detail what we have called above the Consideration Relationship. First, we suggest that a better understanding of this relationship will help meet the goals with which we concluded the previous section. Second, we distinguish between (at least) two ways by which agents can have this relationship with reasons and thus (at least) two distinct ways agents can act for reasons.

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<sup>23</sup> See Di Nucci (2014, esp. chaps. 3 and 4) for a discussion of why mindless behaviors are indeed actions in the traditional sense of the term.

<sup>24</sup> Here, one might wonder whether our account would be better described as disjunctive and thus more complete, rather than simply more fine grained. We favor the latter description, but with two caveats: (1) our concluding account is aimed at explaining human action, so it should be the case that the various ways of relating to and acting for reasons should comprise what it is to be an agent; but (2) granting that it is more fine grained for *human* agents does not entail that we do not share some of those aspects of our capacity for agency with other species. See footnote 13 for a discussion of a related issue.

### 3.1 | The Consideration Relationship: Some preliminaries

Before turning to our positive argument regarding the various ways agents can stand in a Consideration Relationship with their reasons for action, let us begin by identifying two questions that, though related to our concerns here, are not directly germane to our argument.

The first, perhaps surprisingly, is the question “What is a reason (for action)?” Some philosophers approach this question by determining whether reasons are attitudinal states or facts of the matter (e.g., Alvarez, 2009, 2010; Dancy, 1993, 2002; Kearns & Star, 2008). This question asks about reasons *tout court*, and not about the relationship that agents have with their reasons. In this regard, we can distinguish between two distinct, albeit not unrelated, phenomena:

- a. What it is for something to be a reason for action
- b. What it is for an agent to relate to and act for (or in light of) a reason

In this paper, our analysis is restricted to (b). What’s more, as our focus is on how agents relate to their reasons, we believe that we can remain ecumenical about what a reason is. Whether one understands reasons as facts of the matter or as attitudinal states, we can isolate the ways by which agents relate to them (whatever those turn out to be).

A skeptic might contend that if philosophers who defend the view that reasons are facts of the matter are correct, then we ought answer (a) *prior to* (b). We acknowledge that although (a) and (b) ask distinct questions, they are related in at least the following manner: whatever reasons turn out to be will affect our understanding of the exact nature of how agents weigh reasons, deliberate about them, and form intentions in light of them (e.g., Dancy, 2002, pp. 85–104). Note that the converse is also true: whatever we say about the nature of acting for reasons will place some constraints on what can plausibly count as a reason. But we cannot see how either of these constraints will radically alter the way agents relate to their reasons. Even if reasons themselves are not psychological states, the relationship that agents have with them is (and must be) a psychological relationship.<sup>25</sup> And it is this relationship that occupies our attention in this paper.

Other philosophers may consider another issue to be directly germane to our argument: the issue of whether, when one acts in light of reasons, one is acting in light of an attitudinal state (or pro attitude) one has toward the reason or one is acting from a disposition to respond to reasons. We disagree. Nothing in our current analysis of (b) depends on settling this debate. Favoring a dispositional view simply alters the moving parts of the Consideration Relationship. It shifts from an account of the process of considering reasons such that one forms propositional attitudes toward them, to an account of how one responds to recognizing the presence of such reasons. But this does not eliminate the relationship nor the attendant need to explain it.

So what then constitutes the Consideration Relationship? Our claim is that “acting for a reason” picks out a three-part relation *between an agent, her intention/aim/action, and the reason in light of which she acts*.<sup>26</sup> In the next section, we isolate the mode by which agents relate to their reasons, show that there is more than one mode by which agents can do so, and thereby provide a more fine-grained account of relating to (and acting for) reasons. If we are successful, then what we have called the Standard Consideration Relationship View becomes only one way of instantiating this three-part relation.

<sup>25</sup> See Hieronymi (2011) for a related view.

<sup>26</sup> Compare with Skorupski (1997).

### 3.2 | Two ways of standing in the Consideration Relationship with reasons: The Endorsement Relationship and the Directed Relationship

Given the examples discussed above, we contend that there are at least two ways of standing in this relationship with one's reasons:

1. One can have an Endorsement Relationship with one's reasons, which corresponds roughly with what we have called the Standard Consideration Relationship View.
2. One can have a Directed Relationship with one's reasons.

(1) covers the idealized cases discussed above. To cover the non-idealized cases, we propose what we have called the Directed Relationship of relating to one's reasons.

These two types of relationships have distinctive features, which comprise a type-specific Mode of relating to the reason and a type-specific Relation that an agent has with her reason (or the terms under which an agent can articulate her reason)<sup>27</sup>:

- The Endorsement Relationship:
  - Mode: the agent relates to the reason/consideration through the lens of endorsement or rejection.
  - Relation (or the Articulation Condition): the agent acts in light of a reason of which she is aware (or about which she has the relevant beliefs or toward which she has the relevant dispositions), and she endorses it as a reason that she wants to motivate her.
- The Directed Relationship:
  - Mode: the agent relates to the reason/consideration to the extent that the background attitudes, which could constitute reasons or provide a bridge to reasons, are her own.
  - Relation (or the Articulation Condition): the agent undertakes actions where she has the right background belief–desire pairs or dispositions to respond to the relevant facts of the matter such that she could pair her actions with explicit reasons for action, but she does not do so.

Let us consider the Mode and Relation that comprise the Endorsement Relationship by which agents can relate to their reasons for action. In the Endorsement Relationship, the agent relates to her reason as an object of endorsement, and thus, she is aware of the reason as it relates to her decision to undertake a given action. Consider the example wherein you wonder where you should go for dinner this evening, and you decide on your local bistro because it serves your favorite meal. In this case, you endorsed the reason that your favorite meal is served at your local bistro such that you decide to dine there this evening.

With this said, the Endorsement Relationship is multifaceted and deeply involved in our self-understanding in that it allows for revision or rejection of the reason in question on further consideration of it. Consider a revised version of the above example. You and a friend are discussing where you should have dinner this evening. Your friend, being new to town, says you should make the decision. You decide that you want to dine at a lovely restaurant that has recently won a prestigious award. As you walk to the restaurant, however, you realize that you are not really in the mood for a fancy dinner. Rather, upon reflection, you realize that you would prefer to go to a more casual

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<sup>27</sup> We owe the phrase “articulation condition” to Charlie Kurth.

place. Here you bring the lens of endorsement—or what we have called the Mode above—to bear on your reason while in the process of acting on it. Here we see that there is no requirement on the Endorsement Relationship that any previous endorsement is, all things considered, binding.

Still, both examples are somewhat artificial versions of what endorsement means. Often, we stand in the Endorsement Relationship with our reasons in less than “picture perfect” kinds of ways. Thus, even the idealized Endorsement Relationship can admit of different expressions. Consider another example: Jane decides to do her grocery shopping early one morning on discovering that she has no coffee in the house. She quickly scans her countertop, noting that all her jars of nuts and dried fruit are full except for the jar of almonds. She notes that she should also buy almonds, both because she does not want to run out of almonds and she does not like it when her jars, which are on display, are not equally full. When she arrives at the store, she gets most of her groceries but becomes distracted by the store's beautiful display of flowers. After much dilly dallying, she makes her way to the area where the store stocks nuts with the aim of finding the almonds that she remembered she wanted to buy. As she goes to take the almonds that she typically buys off the shelf, she remembers that a friend had impressed upon her the importance of buying organic almonds. She opts to buy the organic almonds for reasons that she had originally given weight but that had not been in the front of her mind when making her list of groceries. Jane nonetheless stands in an Endorsement Relationship with her reason for buying the organic almonds. What distinguishes the case of Jane from other instances of the Endorsement Relationship? Our suggestion is that while the case of Jane's decision to buy the organic almonds appears to be a less idealized version of this relationship, it is in fact an illustration of the *variety of ways* that one can treat one's reasons through what we have called the Mode of endorsement.

Let us now turn to the Relation (or Articulation Condition) component of the Endorsement Relationship. The way we have formulated this component above is ambiguous between two different readings of what constitutes an agent's capacity to articulate her reasons. One reading, on which agents have a self-conscious relationship with their reasons before they form their intentions to act in light of them, is rather strong. Another reading, which allows for a range of responses to constitute the capacity to articulate one's reasons for action, is much weaker. We favor the weaker reading, and here is why. Imagine we have a video of all the behaviors that you execute while driving. Imagine we then ask you, “Why are you holding the wheel in this way?” You can provide a clear reconstruction of what your reasons for doing so probably were—namely, that this is what one needs to do to stay straight in one's lane. But you are able to provide an account of this reason because you have an approximate idea of why you tend to do such things when you drive. If we were to ask “Why did you suddenly turn your head to look out the window?” you *would be able* to articulate some reasons. But we should be considerably less certain that they would be *exactly what your reasons were*. This is because you can only approximate what your reasons probably were (e.g., “I saw something on the side of the road that caught my attention”). This suggests that what we call the Articulation Condition, which is part of the Endorsement Relationship's type-specific Relation, can (and ought to) be understood in weaker terms than one might initially suppose.

Given this point, we must revise our original formulation of the Endorsement Relationship. In particular, we must specify *why* the circumstances that one might typically think undermine one's ability to meet the Articulation Condition *do not actually do so*. That is, they are not defeaters. An agent can meet the Articulation Condition even if:

1. She lacks beliefs (or, at least, true beliefs) about whether her reasons are considerations in favor of what she aims to do, as in cases where she acts impulsively or fails to carefully consider her reasons.

2. She engages in willful rationalization of her actions, knowing in the back of her mind that she lacks good reasons to do what she does and that she is engaging in some form of self-deception. Here imagine the case where you tell yourself that you can skip your morning exercise given that you have had a taxing week. Yet you know that you have not done a sufficient amount of work to justify such a decision nor are you fully convinced that such a consideration frees you from your commitment to exercise regularly. Nonetheless, you endorse your reasons under the guise of self-deception or, what is less difficult to imagine, rationalization.
3. She has reasons to intend actions and yet she knows that these reasons are highly suspect justifications for what she intends to do. An example of this case is when one trusts a passenger's directions for the reason that one believes that the passenger has been to the destination even while doubting that her proposed route is the best route to take.

These three cases show that we can stand in the Endorsement Relationship with our reasons even when we do not meet the idealized picture of the Articulation Condition. This list further shows that the Articulation Condition is not as demanding as one might initially suppose. Thus the account of the Endorsement Relationship provided above accommodates the range of ways agents can endorse their reasons for action.

But our aim is to show that there are additional ways besides the familiar Endorsement Relationship that one can relate to and act for reasons. The motivating cases for pursuing this aim are cases such as skilled actions, purposive actions, and the broader phenomenon of “fluent” agency.<sup>28</sup> What we have called above having a Directed Relationship with one's reasons captures them.

These cases may seem unfamiliar or uncommon in comparison to those that illustrate the Endorsement Relationship. But, as we (Arruda & Povinelli, 2016) suggested elsewhere, the former cases are ubiquitous. Yet even if they were not, this fact would not present a problem for our argument here. Our purpose is exclusively to provide an analytical distinction between these two modes of relating to and acting for reasons.

Let us return to the defining characteristics of the Directed Relationship outlined above. To illustrate the Mode component, consider the earlier example of skilled actions. The professional soccer player does not stand in an Endorsement Relationship with her reasons for dribbling the ball to the left of the defender rather than to the right, but she does nonetheless act for reasons. She has the relevant background attitudes, perhaps in the form of habituated dispositions acquired through practice and drills, regarding how best to avoid the opposing team's defender. These attitudes provide reasons for her actions in that they are *relevant inputs* for her choice.

Notice, however, that the athlete need not make these reasons explicit to herself in order for them to count as her reasons or to render her action one that is done for reasons. All that is required is that she *could* pair her background attitudes with her action in terms of the former providing reasons for the latter.<sup>29,30</sup> This characteristic illustrates the Relation (or Articulation Condition) component of the Directed Relationship. This modal condition should not be read too permissively, otherwise virtually any behavior would count as an instance of an agent standing in a Directed Relationship with her

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<sup>28</sup> One may be tempted to think that these additional ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons are simply “imperfect” cases of the Endorsement Relationship. We suggest that taking this route results in both empirical and explanatory failures. Empirically, we would be unable to fully describe the range of human action. Explanatorily, we would be unable to explain the *specific sense in which these are imperfect cases relative to other (different) imperfect cases*. Nothing about what we argue blocks this description, but we think that there are compelling, substantive reasons to avoid it.

<sup>29</sup> It may be productive to analyze whether this phenomenon is present in postgame interviews in professional sports.

<sup>30</sup> Note that this is yet another difference between the issue that occupies us in this paper and the debate between Dreyfus (2007a, 2007b) and McDowell (2007a, 2007b). See footnotes 14 and 19.

reasons. We do not mean that, in any possible world, an agent could account for her reasons when she is in a Directed Relationship with them. We just mean that, given facts about what this particular agent knows about herself in this actual world, she could give such an account.

But in what sense is the agent's relationship to her reason "directed" rather than being the object of endorsement? First, a comment on the phrase "directed." We say that an agent has a relationship with her reasons that is *directed* if her relevant background attitudes provide the right kind of connection between the agent and her actions. If this picture of our relationship to our reasons sounds strange, it is helpful to consider other cases where we often think that attitudes can direct our actions in the way just described. Here, Helen Steward's description of subintentional actions provides such a model:

[T]he best case for including sub-intentional actions within the class of actions proper [...] rests on the naturalness with which we ascribe the production of the resulting movements to ourselves. When I fiddle with my jewelry,[...] it is me who is fiddling with it, even if I am not aware that I am doing so. [...] I am active in the fiddling [in that] I am producing these movements in the distinctive direct kind of way characteristics of the phenomenon of bodily action, even when I fail to notice that I am doing so and even when I am not producing them intentionally [...] (2009, pp. 300–301).

But this description is merely schematic. There are three features of the relationship that agents have with their reasons such that it should be classified as a Directed Relationship:

- i. The relevant background attitudes are the agent's own (where "own" means that the agent can appeal to those attitudes with relative ease, and she would not be surprised to discover that she has such attitudes).
- ii. These background attitudes *could*, under different conditions, provide a lens through which she may relate to her reason as the object of endorsement.
- iii. Her action does not require (by virtue of the kind of action that it is) an explicit relation to these background attitudes or to the reasons that they may generate. That is, the agent can perform the action without appealing to her reasons in terms of whether she endorses them.

Here, (i) specifies the condition that the agent must, upon articulating the background attitudes that comprise her reason, identify such attitudes as her own. This condition does not require that the agent actually endorse the reasons. More weakly, it simply means that she is not surprised to discover that she holds the beliefs and desires in question. Condition (ii) specifies the counterfactual articulation condition, according to which the agent in question counts as being able to articulate her reasons in the Directed Relationship in light of the information about herself to which she currently has access and the kind of agent that she is. Finally, (iii) specifies that, at least analytically, those cases that we classify as instances of the Directed Relationship cannot be simultaneously justifiably understood as instances of the Endorsement Relationship. We discuss the case of mixed actions, where agents stand in both relationships to successively distinct parts of a chain of interdependent actions, in Section 5.

Let us return to the test case of Jamie the raspberry farmer. She is sufficiently accustomed to the delicate touch that one must take with each berry and the spines on the plant such that she does not need to remind herself of these considerations in order to approximate the proper amount of force at she pulls each berry from the vine. Does Jamie have a Directed Relationship with her reasons? We think she does:

1. She has the relevant beliefs about picking raspberries and the relevant goal of harvesting her plants.<sup>31</sup>
2. She has these background attitudes in (1) just when the harvesting season begins.
3. When she launches the action of picking raspberries, the relevant background attitudes establish the connection between her bodily movements and possible reasons for action.
4. Yet the attitudes in (3) are not currently objects of endorsement.

A natural concern is that too many cases meet the criteria for standing in a Directed Relationship with one's reasons. It would seem that even quasi-reflective behaviors, such as when one reaches out to break one's fall, would meet the criteria. In this regard, we need to further delimit the set of cases that can plausibly count. Still, we contend that these cases are ubiquitous. So the problem is not the number of cases. Rather, there may be cases that ought not count as instances of acting for reasons *in any sense*, and yet they count as such due to an overly permissive understanding of acting for reasons.

A promising option for blocking these cases is to consider a limit case for standing in a Directed Relationship with one's reasons. A useful limit case is that of acting on a hunch.<sup>32</sup> A biologist acting on a hunch that a given hypothesis is true and designing her experiment around it would constitute *something akin* to having a Directed Relationship with her reasons. This is because she has a vague idea of why a given claim sounds like it is probably true, but she cannot cite clear reasons for why she tends to think that she should pursue this claim over another—hence the descriptor “hunch.” Yet this is a limit case for our account because it is clear that she is less able to articulate her reasons for pursuing her hunch than in some of the other examples discussed above. At the same time, she is clearly more able to articulate her reasons than in the case of reflexively extending one's hand to break one's fall.

### 3.3 | Two ways of acting for reasons

If agents can relate to their reasons in two different ways, then it follows that there are (at least) two ways of acting for reasons: (1) reason-considered action and (2) reason-directed action. We have provided a detailed justification for this latter distinction between kinds of actions elsewhere (Arruda & Povinelli, 2016). Our purpose in this section is to connect our argument in this paper regarding the two ways of relating to reasons with the aforementioned account. We suggest that our argument here provides an additional piece of the puzzle for explaining actions that do not fit the idealized picture. Reason-considered actions will simply be cases where agents have an Endorsement Relationship with their reasons. Reason-directed actions are those cases that we have suggested are difficult to classify and thus are those actions with which agents have a Directed Relationship.

We have argued elsewhere that reason-directed actions will be actions that meet the following conditions (we quote verbatim from Arruda & Povinelli, 2016, p. 2141):

- “1. The action is not reason devoid because the action is not best explained by reflexes possessed by the agent, such as a conditioned response or as an accident.

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<sup>31</sup> As the debate between know-how and know-that illustrates, such “relevant” beliefs vary widely. For the sake of simplicity, we mean that the agent in question has the kinds of beliefs that link her goals with the instrumental route that she has taken to satisfy them. These need not be particularly specific, as many people will be unable to fully articulate exactly how what they are doing fulfills their goals (e.g., the musician may not be able to fully articulate how she plays a given note on the violin in the way that she does). We thank an anonymous referee for this example.

<sup>32</sup> We owe the case of the hunch to Eric Wiland. We also thank Charlie Kurth for discussing this case with us.

2. The action falls short of being reasonably classified as reason-considered, either because the agent in question lacks the abilities to engage in reason-considered action or, if the agent does possess the relevant capacities, she does not relate to her reasons in a second-order, explicit fashion.
3. The action is purposeful or has an end goal.
4. The action is best explained, against available alternatives outlined in (1), in terms of some belief or, for those not capable of propositional thought, belief-like state and some desire, or desire-like state, that the agent in these circumstances is likely to possess.”

With these conditions in mind, consider some examples of reason-directed action, such as stirring a risotto while it is cooking on the stove or making whipped cream by hand. In both cases, we perform these actions without considering or evaluating the reasons for doing them. Yet the actions are far from “mindless.” Instead, they are the kinds of actions for which we have the relevant background attitudes. For example, we know how rapidly to stir the risotto so that it does not stick, but we do not need to recall these beliefs while in the process of stirring. We provide many more examples in (Arruda & Povinelli, 2016, pp. 2145–2146). If what we have argued here is correct, these are also cases in which we stand in a Directed Relationship with our reasons.

#### 4 | OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES

Someone may object that we cannot explain cases where agents act for reasons that they cannot articulate even while these reasons are embodied in their dispositions. This objection is closely allied with the discussion of what is often called “reasons-responsiveness” in virtue ethics (Arpaly, 2003; Bennett, 1974; Driver, 2001; Markovits, 2010, pp. 208–209).<sup>33</sup> The reasons-responsiveness debate is primarily concerned with the conditions under which we can justifiably claim that an agent has a virtuous character even though she does the right actions for the wrong reasons. Some philosophers contend that such an agent is indeed virtuous because her character (but not her articulation of her reasons) is responsive to the right kind of reasons. As Arpaly (2003, pp. 9–10, pp. 77–78) and others<sup>34</sup> understand it, this case is best represented by Huckleberry Finn. Huck decides to hide Jim from his would-be captors, but not for the reason that Jim deserves respect and humane treatment and thus to be hidden from those who would seek to re-enslave him. Still, says the proponent of the thesis of reasons-responsiveness, it would be inaccurate to simply say that Huck did the right thing (save Jim) for the wrong reasons.<sup>35</sup> Rather, Huck has the kind of character such that he is responsive to the right reasons, as evidenced by his decision not to turn Jim in. It is simply that his articulation of his reasons is confused and polluted by the racist conventions of the time.

Here, someone might contend that the case of Huck Finn is a counterexample to our account of both the Endorsement and the Directed Relationships an agent can have with her reasons. Namely, it produces a contradiction: Huck both does *and* does not have the right reasons to save Jim. This is because Huck has a half-hearted Endorsement Relationship to the (bad) reason of not depriving Jim's owner of her property, but ultimately he does not act on this reason. His action of saving Jim would appear to be the hallmark of having a Directed Relationship with his reasons. His character is such that, underneath those norms that he gained from membership in a racist, slave-owning society, he

<sup>33</sup> We owe this objection and the relevance of the case of Huckleberry Finn for our argument to Julia Driver.

<sup>34</sup> See Bennett (1974) for an earlier discussion of this case.

<sup>35</sup> Even those who are not invested in the reasons-responsiveness debate—for example, Markovits (2010, p. 208)—grant that Huck acted for *some of the right reasons* in that he appreciated that Jim should not be enslaved.

has the right kind of attitudes to motivate his action. Note here that the problem is not that he stands in both an Endorsement Relationship and a Directed Relationship with his reasons; it is that the reasons in question dictate opposing courses of action, and he has a relationship with each reason.

Rather than presenting a counterexample, we think our view helps to explain the case of Huck Finn, as well as to vindicate the claims of the proponent of the reasons-responsiveness explanation. Although our account may result in the supposed contradiction outlined above, we deny that it is genuinely a logical contradiction. In fact, it is precisely this strange situation that the reasons-responsiveness literature is supposed to explain. But, more important, our account does not entail what would be a problematic contradiction—namely, that Huck both is responsive to and is not responsive to the right kind of reasons. Our account shows that he is responsive to the right kind of reasons—namely, those embedded in (part of) his character that represent reasons with which Huck has a Directed Relationship. Now, it is clear that Huck would have a more difficult time meeting the Articulation Condition in this case, but it is not impossible for him to do so. Thus, the case of Huckleberry Finn in particular, and the problem of explaining cases of reasons-responsiveness more broadly, is both consistent with what we have argued and enriched by the resources that our account provides.

## 5 | THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-HUMAN ANIMAL AGENCY

The argument that we have developed here is intended to describe an aspect of human agency that we have suggested is underappreciated. By way of conclusion, we would like to indicate how this argument lays the foundation for considering the case of non-human animal agency. As a caveat, we are not simply importing our account regarding humans to the case of non-human animals. Rather, our aim is to outline how the view developed here has analogous promise for explaining the case of chimpanzees, while also noting that we must make important modifications to it in light of issues associated with non-human animals' capacity for propositional thought.

We have argued elsewhere that chimpanzees in particular are agents in that they engage in a form of reason-directed action (Arruda & Povinelli, 2016). There, we suggested that we can build a picture of chimpanzee agency without committing to the claim that they engage in higher-order, propositional thought. In our argument here, one might find an additional piece to add to this picture.

Note that we do not think that chimpanzees can stand in an Endorsement Relationship with their reasons. Nor do we think that they must be capable of propositional thought (and thereby hold beliefs and desires). But we *do* think that they can engage in what we have called reason-directed action, with the relevant modifications for the kinds of attitudinal states that they can have (Arruda & Povinelli, 2016). And if they can engage in reason-directed action, our argument here explains how to understand the relationship that chimpanzees plausibly have with their reasons—that is, a Directed Relationship. Naturally, we must make some modifications to the terms of the Directed Relationship in the case of chimpanzees, given that chimpanzees probably do not engage in propositional thought nor are they likely to hold propositional attitudes (we [2016] call them “belief-like” and “desire-like” attitudes in that they serve functionally similar roles to beliefs and desires in the human case).<sup>36</sup> Similarly, they will be unable to consider their reasons *as reasons*, thereby requiring modification to what we have above called the Relation (or Articulation Condition) component of the Directed Relationship. Still, when Megan the chimpanzee sorts through a pile of bananas to find the one that is the

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<sup>36</sup> As we have argued elsewhere (2016), we do not take a stand in this debate because we aim to provide an argument that does not depend on unsettled issues in the debate about non-human animal minds. If it turns out that chimpanzees do engage in propositional thought, all the better for our argument. For the moment, however, we would like to remain ecumenical regarding this possibility.

most overly ripe of the bunch, we can say that Megan stands in a Directed Relationship with her reasons given that her preference for overly ripe bananas guides her behaviors. In this regard, we believe that we merely need to weaken the aforementioned components of the Directed Relationship in the case of chimpanzees.

In this way, our argument about humans' capacity to act for reasons in a variety of ways sets the stage for enriching our picture of non-human animal agency—specifically, how non-human animals may be understood as having a relationship to their reasons even without committing to the claim that they engage in propositional thought.

## 6 | CONCLUSION

We have shown that agents act for reasons in a variety of ways, but not simply because the types of reasons for which they act vary. Instead, we have argued that the *kinds of relationships* that agents have with their reasons are more fine grained and diverse than the available literature can explain. Providing the resources for describing these cases broadens our understanding of human agency, both in terms of its idealized expression and its ubiquity in everyday life. Doing so also begins to build a bridge to the case of non-human animal agency, particularly those instances of agency that are closest to ours—that of non-human primates, such as chimpanzees.

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