Books, Monographs, Edited Volumes

Barker, K.B. & Povinelli, D.J. (Eds.). (2021). The Aesop’s fable paradigm, An unlikely intersection of folklore and science. 245 pp. Indiana University Press.

Barker, B. K. & Povinelli, D. J. (2019) Folklore as an (unlikely) frame for science, The Aesop’s fable paradigm, special issue of Journal of Folklore Research, 56, No. 2-3, 1-291 (co-editors, with contributions by William Hansen, Gregg Schremp, Laura Hennefield and Grace Hwang.) [pdf] 

Povinelli, D. J. (2012). World without weight: Perspectives on an alien mind. Oxford University Press. 394 pp.

Povinelli, D. J. (2000). Folk physics for apes: The chimpanzee's theory of how the world works. Oxford University Press. 394 pp. [Reprinted, 2003 with revisions and a new Forward by Nicholas Humphrey]

Povinelli, D. J. & Eddy, T. J. (1996). What young chimpanzees know about seeing. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development (Vol. 61, No. 2, Serial No. 247). 189 pp.  [pdf]

Povinelli, D. J. (1986). Social intelligence in monkeys and apes. PhD Dissertation, Yale University. [pdf]

Facing the foundational challenges to understanding other minds

How comparative psychology mirrors animal folk tales

Peer-Reviewed Publications

Arruda, C.T. & Povinelli, D.J. (2023, forthcoming). Why idealized agency gets animal (and human) agency wrong. In P. Henne and S. Murray (Eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. London: Bloomsbury. [pdf]

Glorioso, G.C., Kuznar, S.L., Pavlic, M. & Povinelli, D.J. (2021). Still no solution to non-verbal measures of analogical reasoning: A reply to Walker & Gopnik (2017). Cognition, 214, 104288. [pdf] 

Povinelli, D. J. (2020). Can comparative psychology crack its toughest nut? Animal Behavior and Cognition, 7 (4), 589-653. [invited article for special issue to recognize the 20th anniversary of the publication of Folk physics for apes, Povinelli, Oxford, 2000] [pdf] 

Henley, T. & Povinelli, D. J. (2020). Seeing through <seeing through>: An analysis of Kano et al. (2019). Animal Behavior and Cognition, 7 (4), 659-661. [pdf] 

Kuznar, S. L., Pavlic, M., Glorioso, G. C., & Povinelli, D. J. (2020). Deconstructing the raven’s theory of mind: An analysis of Bugnyar et al. (2016). Animal Behavior and Cognition, 7 (4), 654-658. [pdf] 

Povinelli, D. J. & Henley, T. (2020). More rope tricks reveal why more task variants will never lead to strong inferences about higher-order casual reasoning in chimpanzees. Animal Behavior and Cognition, 7 (3), 392-418. [invited article for special issue to recognize the 20th anniversary of the publication of Folk physics for apes, Povinelli, Oxford, 2000] [pdf] 

Barker, K. B. & Povinelli, D. J. (2019a). Anthropomorphomania and the rise of the animal mind: A conversation. In Folklore as an (unlikely) frame for science, The Aesop’s fable paradigm, special issue of Journal of Folklore Research, 56 (1-2), 71-90. [pdf] 

Barker, K. B. & Povinelli, D. J. (2019b). Conclusion: Old Ideas and the Science of Animal Folklore. In Folklore as an (unlikely) frame for science, The Aesop’s fable paradigm, special issue of Journal of Folklore Research, 56 (1-2), 113-123. [pdf] 

Hennefield, L., Hwang, H. G., & Povinelli, D. J. (2019). Going meta: Retelling the scientific retelling of Aesop’s “Crow and the Pitcher.” In Folklore as an (unlikely) frame for science, The Aesop’s fable paradigm, special issue of Journal of Folklore Research, 56 (1-2), 45-69. [pdf] 

Povinelli, D. J. & Barker, K. B. (2019a). Introduction: The perplexities of water. In Folklore as an (unlikely) frame for science, The Aesop’s fable paradigm, special issue of Journal of Folklore Research, 56 (1-2), 1-13. [pdf] 

Povinelli, D. J. & Barker, K. B. (2019b). Appendix: Doctor Fomomindo’s preliminary notes for a future index of anthropomorphized animal behaviors. In Folklore as an (unlikely) frame for science, The Aesop’s fable paradigm, special issue of Journal of Folklore Research, 56 (1-2), 125-291. [pdf] 

Povinelli, D. J., Glorioso, G. C., Kuznar, S. L., & Pavlic, M. (2019). Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42, E271. [invited peer commentary]  [pdf]

Hennefield, L., Hwang, H. G., Weston, S. J. & Povinelli, D. J. (2018). Meta-analytic techniques reveal that corvid causal reasoning in the Aesop’s Fable paradigm is driven by trial-and-error learning. Animal Cognition. 21 (6), 735-748.  [pdf]

Arruda, C. T. & Povinelli, D. J. (2018). Two ways of relating to (and acting for) reasons. Mind & Language. 33, 441-459.  [pdf]

Shaw, J. A., Bryant, L.K., Malle, F. M., Povinelli, D. J., & Pruett, J. R. (2017). The relationship between joint attention and theory of mind in neurotypical adults. Consciousness and Cognition, 51, 268-278. [pdf]

Povinelli, D. J. & Frey, S. (2016). Constraints on the exploitation of the functional properties of objects in expert tool-using chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Cortex, 82, 11–23. [pdf]

Pruett, J. R. & Povinelli, D. J. (2016). Autism spectrum disorder: spectrum or cluster? Autism Research. 9, 1237–1240. [pdf]

Arruda, C. T. & Povinelli, D. J. (2016). Chimps as secret agents. Synthese, 193 (7), 2129-2158. [pdf]

Pruett, J. R., Jr., Kandala, S., Petersen, S. E., & Povinelli, D. J. (2015). Theory of mind, relational reasoning, and social responsiveness in children with and without autism: demonstration of feasibility for a larger-scale study. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 45, 2243-51. [pdf]

Faughn, C., Marrus, N., Shuman, J., Petersen, S. E., Constantino, J. N., Pruett, J. R., Jr., & Povinelli, D.J. (2014). Chimpanzee social responsiveness scale detects individual variation in species-typical social responsiveness. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 45, 1483-8. [pdf]

Pruett, J.R., Hoertel, S., Constantino, J.N., LaMacchia, A., Moll, K., McVey, E., Squire, S., Feczko, E., Povinelli, D.J., & Petersen, S.E. (2013). Impaired eye region search accuracy in children with autistic spectrum disorders. PLOS One 8(3): e58167. [pdf]

Bryant, L., Coffey, A., Povinelli, D.J., & Pruett, J.R., Jr. (2013). Theory of mind experience sampling in typical adults. Consciousness and Cognition, 22, 697-707. [pdf]

Hasenstein, K.H., John, S., Scherp, P., Povinelli, D., Mopper, S. (2013). Analysis of magnetic gradients to study gravitropism. American Journal of Botany, 100, 1-7. [pdf]

Gallagher, S. & Povinelli, D.J. (2012). Enactive and behavioral abstraction accounts of social understanding in chimpanzees, infants, and adults. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 3, 145-169. [pdf]

Frey, S. & Povinelli, D.J. (2012). Comparative investigations of manual action representations: evidence for context sensitive action selection in chimpanzees. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 367, 48-58. [pdf]

Marrus, N. Faughn, C., Shuman, J., Petersen, S., Constantino, J., Povinelli, D., & Pruett, J.R., Jr. (2011). Initial description of a quantitative, cross-species (chimpanzee-human) social reciprocity measure. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 21, 321–330. [pdf]

Vonk, J. & Povinelli, D.J. (2011). Determinants of individual differences in long-term cognitive testing in a group of captive chimpanzees. International Journal of Comparative Cognition, 24, 137-167. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Reaux, J.E., & Frey, S.H. (2010). Chimpanzees’ tool use provides evidence for separable representations of hand and tool even during active use within peripersonal space. Neuropsychologia, 48, 243-247. [pdf]

Okamoto-Barth, S., Moore, C., Barth, J., Subiaul, F., & Povinelli, D.J. (2010). Carryover-effect of joint attention to repeated events in chimpanzees and young children. Developmental Science, 14, 440-452. [pdf]

Vonk, J., Brosnan, S., Silk, J., Henrich, J., Richardson, A., Lambeth, S., Schapiro, S., Povinelli, D. (2008) Chimpanzees do not take advantage of very low cost opportunities to deliver food to unrelated group members. Animal Behavior, 75, 1757-1770. [pdf]

Penn, D.C., Holyoak, K.J., & Povinelli, D.J. (2008a). Darwin’s mistake: explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 31, 109-130. [Target article.] [pdf]

Penn, D.C., Holyoak, K.J. & Povinelli, D.J. (2008b). Darwin’s triumph: explaining the uniqueness of the human mind without a deus ex machina. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 31, 153-178. [Reply to commentaries.] [pdf]

Moore, C. & Povinelli, D.J. (2007). Differences in how 12- and 24-month-olds interpret the gaze of adults. Infancy, 11, 215-231. [pdf]

Moore, C., Mealiea, J., Garon, N., & Povinelli, D.J. (2007). The development of the bodily self. Infancy, 11, 157-174. [pdf]

Penn, D.C. & Povinelli, D.J. (2007). On the lack of evidence that chimpanzees possess anything remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind.’ Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B, 362, 731-744. [pdf]

Penn, D.C. & Povinelli, D.J. (2007). Causal cognition in human and nonhuman animals: A comparative, critical review. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 97-118. [pdf]

Silk, J., Brosnan, S.F., Vonk, J., Henrich, J., Povinelli, D.J., Shapiro, S., Richardson, A, Lambeth, S.P., & Mascaro, J. (2006). Animal Behaviour: Chimpanzee choice and prosociality (reply). Nature, 440, E6. [pdf]

Barth, J., Reaux, J. E., & Povinelli, D.J. (2005). Chimpanzees’ (Pan troglodytes) use of gaze cues in object-choice tasks: different methods yield different results. Animal Cognition, 8(2), 84-92. [pdf]

Silk, J.B., Brosnan, S.F., Vonk, J., Henrich, J., Povinelli, D.J., Richardson, A.F., Lambeth, S.P., Mascaro, J., Schapiro, S.J. (2005). Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of other group members. Nature, 435, 1357-1359. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Vonk, J. (2004). We don’t need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee’s mind. Mind and Language, 19, 1-28. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (2004). Behind the ape’s appearance: Escaping anthropomorhism in the study of other minds. Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Winter, 29-41. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Theall, L.A., Reaux, J.E., & Dunphy-Lelii, S. (2003). Chimpanzees spontaneously modify the direction of their gestural signals to match the attentional orientation of others. Animal Behaviour, 65, 71-79. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Vonk, J. (2003). Chimpanzee minds: Suspiciously human? Trends in Cognitive Science, 7, 157-160. [pdf]

de Veer, M. W., Gallup, G.G., Jr., Theall, L.A., van den Bos, R., & Povinelli, D.J. (2003). A longitudinal study of mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Neuropsychologia, 41, 229-34. [pdf]

Karin-D’Arcy, R. & Povinelli, D.J. (2002). Do chimpanzees know what each other see? A closer look. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 15, 21-54. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Dunphy-Lelii, S, Reaux, J.E., & Mazza, M.P. (2002). Psychological diversity in chimpanzees and humans: New longitudinal assessments of chimpanzees’ understanding of attention. Brain, Behavior, and Evolution, 59, 33-53. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Giambrone, S. (2001). Reasoning about beliefs: A human specialization? Child Development, 72, 691-695. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Dunphy-Lelii, S. (2001). Do chimpanzees seek explanations? Preliminary comparative investigations. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55, 93-101. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Bering, J., & Giambrone, S. (2000). Toward a science of other minds: Escaping the argument by analogy. Cognitive Science, 24, 509-541. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Giambrone, S. (1999). Inferring other minds: Failure of the argument by analogy. Philosophical Topics, 27, 167-201. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Landry, A.M., Theall, L.A., Clark, B.R., & Castille, C.M. (1999). Development of young children's understanding that the recent past is causally bound to the present. Developmental Psychology, 35, 1426-1439. [pdf]

Theall, L.A., & Povinelli, D.J. (1999). Do chimpanzees tailor their attention-getting behaviors to fit the attentional states of others? Animal Cognition, 2, 207-214. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Bierschwale, D.T., & Cech, C.G. (1999). Comprehension of seeing as a referential act in young children, but not juvenile chimpanzees. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 17, 37-60. [pdf]

Reaux, J.E., Theall, L.A., & Povinelli, D.J. (1999). A longitudinal investigation of chimpanzees' understanding of visual perception. Child Development, 70, 275-290. [pdf]

Sterling, E.J. & Povinelli, D.J. (1999). Tool use, aye-ayes, and sensorimotor intelligence. Folia primatologica, 70, 8-16.  [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Perilloux, H.K., Reaux, J.E., & Bierschwale, D.T. (1998). Young and juvenile chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) reactions to intentional versus accidental and inadvertent actions. Behavioral Processes, 42, 205-218. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Simon, B.B. (1998). Young children's reactions to briefly versus extremely delayed images of the self: Emergence of the autobiographical stance. Developmental Psychology, 43, 188-194. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Reaux, J.E., Bierschwale, D.T., Allain, A.D., & Simon, B.B. (1997). Exploitation of pointing as a referential gesture in young children, but not adolescent chimpanzees. Cognitive Development, 12, 423-461. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Eddy, T.J. (1997). Specificity of gaze-following in young chimpanzees. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 15, 213-222. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Gallup, G.G., Jr., Eddy, T.J., Bierschwale, D.T., Engstrom, M.C., Perilloux, H.K., & Toxopeus, I.B. (1997). Chimpanzees recognize themselves in mirrors. Animal Behaviour, 53, 1083-1088. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Eddy, T.J. (1996). Chimpanzees: Joint visual attention. Psychological Science, 7, 129-135. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Eddy, T.J. (1996). Factors influencing young chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) recognition of attention. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 110, 336-345. [pdf]

Eddy, T. J., Gallup Jr, G. G., & Povinelli, D. J. (1996). Age differences in the ability of chimpanzees to distinguish mirror-images of self from video-images of others. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 110, 38-44. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Landau, K.R., & Perilloux, H.K. (1996). Self-recognition in young children using delayed versus live feedback: Evidence of a developmental asynchrony. Child Development, 67, 1540-1554. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1996). Growing up ape. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development (Vol. 61, No. 2, Serial No. 247), pp. 174-189. [pdf]

Gallup, G.G., Jr., Povinelli, D.J., Suarez, S.D., Anderson, J.R., Lethmate, J., & Menzel, E.W. (1995). Further reflections on self-recognition in primates. Animal Behaviour, 50, 1525-1532. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., & Cant, J.G.H. (1995). Arboreal clambering and the evolution of self-conception. Quarterly Review of Biology, 70, 393-421. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Preuss, T.M. (1995). Theory of mind: Evolutionary history of a cognitive specialization. Trends in Neuroscience, 18, 418-424. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Eddy, T.J. (1994). The eyes as a window: What young chimpanzees see on the other side. Current Psychology of Cognition, 13, 695-705. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Davis, D.R. (1994). Differences between chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and humans (Homo sapiens) in the resting state of the index finger: Implications for pointing. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108, 134-139. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Rulf, A.B., & Bierschwale, D. (1994). Absence of knowledge attribution and self-recognition in young chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108, 74-80. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1993). Reconstructing the evolution of mind. American Psychologist, 48, 493-509. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Rulf, A.R., Landau, K. & Bierschwale, D.T. (1993). Self-recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): Distribution, ontogeny, and patterns of emergence. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 107, 347-372. [pdf]

Eddy, T.J., Gallup, G.G., Jr., & Povinelli, D.J. (1993). Attribution of cognitive states to animals: Anthropomorphism in comparative perspective. Journal of Social Issues, 49, 87-101. [pdf]

Gallup, G.G., Jr. & Povinelli, D.J. (1993). Mirror, mirror, on the wall, which is the most heuristic theory of them all? New Ideas in Psychology, 11, 327-335. [pdf]

Hess, J., Novak, M.A., & Povinelli, D.J. (1993). "Natural pointing" in a rhesus monkey, but no evidence of empathy. Animal Behaviour, 46, 1023-1025. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & deBlois, S. (1992). Young children's (Homo sapiens) understanding of knowledge formation in themselves and others. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 106, 228-238. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Parks, K.A., Novak, M.A. (1992). Role reversal by rhesus monkeys, but no evidence of empathy. Animal Behaviour, 44, 269-281. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Nelson, K.E. & Boysen, S.T. (1992). Comprehension of role reversal by chimpanzees: Evidence of empathy? Animal Behaviour, 43, 633-640. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Parks, K.A. & Novak, M.A. (1991). Do rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) attribute knowledge and ignorance to others? Journal of Comparative Psychology, 105, 318-325. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Nelson, K.E. & Boysen, S.T. (1990). Inferences about guessing and knowing by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 104, 203-210. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1989). Failure to find self-recognition in Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) in contrast to their use of mirrors cues to discover hidden food. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 102, 122-131. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1988). Intention and attribution in primates: A new quest for mind. Yale Graduate Journal of Anthropology, 1, 37-48. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1987). Monkeys, apes, mirrors and minds: The evolution of self-awareness in primates. Human Evolution, 2, 493-509. [pdf]

Petto, A.J. & Povinelli, D.J. (1985). Some preliminary observations of vervets (Cercopithecus aethiops) from the Greatheeds pond area on St. Kitts, W.I. Canadian Review of Physical Anthropology, 5, 77-81. [pdf]

Books Chapters and Others

Arruda, C.T.,  & Povinelli, D.J. (in press) Why idealized agency gets animal (and human) agency wrong. In P. Henne and Sam Murray (Eds.) Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Routledge, Taylor & Francis.

Penn, D.C., & Povinelli, D.J. (2013). The comparative delusion: beyond behavioristic and mentalistic explanations for nonhuman social cognition. Pp. 62-81. In H.S. Terrace & J. Metcalfe, (Eds.). Agency and Joint Attention. Oxford, Oxford University Press. [pdf]

Penn, D.C. & Povinelli, D.J. (2012). The human enigma. Pp. 529-542. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press. [link]

Penn, D.C., Holyoak, K.J. & Povinelli, D.J. (2012). So are we the massively lucky species? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35, 236-237. [pdf]

Vonk, J., & Povinelli, D.J. (2012). Similarity and difference in the conceptual systems of primates: The unobservability hypothesis. Pp. 552-573. In E. Wasserman and T. Zentall (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of Comparative Cognition. Oxford, Oxford University Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (2011). Review of Beyond the brain: How the body shapes the mind (by Louise Barrett) Human Ethology Bulletin, 26(2) 36-39. [pdf]

Zwicker, S., Moore, C., & Povinelli, D.J. (2011). The development of body representations: The integration of visual-proprioceptive information. pp. 19-36. In V. Slaughter & C. Brownell (Eds.). Early development of body representations. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., & Penn, D.C. (2011). Through a floppy tool darkly: Toward a conceptual overthrow of animal alchemy. Pp. 69-88. In McCormack, T., Hoerl, C., & Butterfill, S. (Eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [pdf]

Vonk, J., & Povinelli, D.J. (2011). Social and physical reasoning in human-reared chimpanzees: new data from a set of preliminary studies. Pp. 342-352. In Eilan, N., Lerman, H. & Roessler, J. (Eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford, Oxford University Press. [pdf]

Vonk, J., & Povinelli, D.J. (2010). Animal Intelligence. In Weiner, I.B. & Craighead,W.E. (Ed.), The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology, Volume 4, 4th edition. Wiley Publishers, Washington, D.C. [pdf]

Penn, D.C., Holyoak, K.J., & Povinelli, D.J. (2009). Universal grammar and mental continuity: Two modern myths. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 462-464. [pdf]

Penn, D.C., & Povinelli. D.J. (2009). On becoming approximately rational: The relational reinterpretation hypothesis. In S. Watanabe, L. Huber, A. Blaisdel, & A. Young (Eds.), Rational animals, irrational humans. Tokyo: Keio University Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D., Penn, D., & Holyoak, K. (2009) An open letter to comparative psychologists. Psychological Science Agenda, May 2009. [published on-line] [link]

Penn, D.C., Cheng, P., Holyoak, K.J., Hummel, J.E., Povinelli, D.J. (2009). There is more to thinking than propositions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 221-223. [pdf]

Penn, D.C. & Povinelli, D.J. (2007). On the lack of evidence that chimpanzees possess anything remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind.’ In N. Emery, N. Clayton & C. Frith (Eds.) Social intelligence: From brain to culture. Pp. 393-414. Oxford, OUP. [pdf]

Subiaul, F., Okamoto-Barth, S., Barth, J., & Povinelli, D.J. (2007). Human cognitive specializations. In Todd M. Preuss & Jon H. Kaas (Eds.) Evolution of Nervous Systems: Volume V, The Evolution of Primate Nervous Systems. Pp. 509-528. Elsevier: New York. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Vonk, J. (2006). We don’t need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee’s mind. In S. Hurley (Ed.), Rational Animals. pp. 385-412. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [pdf]

Vonk, J. & Povinelli, D.J. (2006). Similarity and difference in the conceptual systems of primates: The unobservability hypothesis. In E. Wasserman and T. Zentall (Eds.) Comparative Cognition: Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence. pp. 363-387. Oxford University Press. [pdf]

LeBlanc, C. & Povinelli, D. (2005). National Chimpanzee Observatory. DVD. DesignVision. Lafayette, Louisiana. [link]

Povinelli, D.J., & Barth, J. (2005) Reinterpreting behavior: A human specialization? Commentary on Tomasello et al. Understanding and sharing intention: the origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 712-713.  [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Prince, C.G., & Preuss (2005). Parental-offspring conflict and the development of social understanding. In P. Carruthers (Ed.) Innateness and the Structure of the Mind. pp. 239-253. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [pdf]

Barth, J., Povinelli, D.J., & Cant, J.G.H. (2004). Bodily origins of SELF. In D. Beike, J. Lampinen, & D. Behrend, Eds., Self and memory, pp. 3-43, New York: Psychology Press. [pdf]

Bering, J.M. & Povinelli, D.J. (2003). Comparing cognitive development. In D. Maestripieri, Ed. Primate psychology: Bridging the gap between the mind and behavior of human and nonhuman primates. pp. 205-233. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Bering, J., & Giambrone (2003).Chimpanzee ‘pointing’: Another error of the argument by analogy? In S. Kita (Ed.), pp. 35-68, Pointing: Where language culture and cognition meet. Lawrence Erlbaum. [pdf]

Giambrone, S. & Povinelli, D.J. (2002). Consciousness. In M. Pagel, Ed., Encyclopedia of Evolution, pp. 192-196. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Bering, J.M. (2002). The mentality of apes revisited. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 115-119. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Povinelli, T.J. (2001). Review of The chimpanzees of the Taï forest: Behavioral Ecology and Evolution, by C. Boesch & H. Boesch-Achermann, Ethology, 107, 463-464. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (2001). On the possibilities of detecting intentions prior to understanding them. In B. Malle, D. Baldwin, & L. Moses (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, pp. 225-248. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (2001). The Self: Elevated in consciousness and extended in time. In C. Moore & K. Lemmon (Eds.), The self in time: Developmental perspectives, pp. 73-94. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (2001). The minds of humans and apes are different outcomes of an evolutionary experiment. In S. Fitzpatrick & J. Bruer (Eds.), Carving our Destiny: Scientific Research Faces a new millennium, pp. 1-40. National Academy of Sciences and John Henry Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & O’Neill, D.K. (2000). Do chimpanzees use their gestures to instruct each other? In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and D.J. Cohen (Eds.). Understanding other minds: Perspectives from autism - 2nd Edition, pp. 459-487. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1999). Social understanding in chimpanzees: New Evidence from a longitudinal approach. In P. Zelazo, J. Astington, & D. Olson (Eds.), Developing theories of intention: Social understanding and self-control, pp. 195-225. Hillsdale,N.J.: Erlbaum. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (Winter, 1998). Can animals empathize? Scientific American Presents: Exploring Intelligence, 9(4): 67, 72-75. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Povinelli, T.J., & Giambrone, S. (1998). Review of Reaching into thought: The minds of the great apes, Ed. by A.E. Russon, K.A. Bard, & S.T. Parker. Trends in Cognitive Science, 2, 158-159. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Prince, C.G. (1998). When self met other. In M. Ferrari & R.J. Sternberg (Eds.), Self-awareness: Its nature and development, pp. 37-107. New York: Guilford. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1997). Panmorphism. In R.W. Mitchell, N.S. Thompson, & H.L. Miles (Eds.), Anthropomorphism, anecdotes and animals, pp. 92-103. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Povinelli, M.J. (1996). Where ideas fail best. In L. Pyenson (Ed.), Teaching and Research in the University, pp. 39-49. Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Povinelli, T.J. (1996). Review of The thinking ape: Evolutionary origins of intelligence, by Richard Byrne. International Journal of Primatology, 17, 901-90. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Povinelli, T.J. (1996). Review of Mindblindness. An essay on autism and theory of mind, by Simon Baron-Cohen. Trends in Neuroscience, 19, 299-300. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J., Zebouni, M.C., & Prince, C.G. (1996). Ontogeny, evolution and folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 137-138. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1996). Chimpanzee theory of mind? The long road to strong inference. In P. Carruthers & P. Smith (Eds). Theories of theories of mind, pp. 293-329. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1995). The unduplicated self. In P. Rochat (Ed.), The self in early infancy, pp.161-192. Amsterdam: North-Holland-Elsevier. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1995). Chimpanzees, children, and the mind of the eyes. Psychological Science Agenda, 8(6), 9-11. [pdf]

 Povinelli, D.J. (1995). Review of Hominid culture in primate perspective (Edited by D. Quiatt & J. Itani). American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 96, 322-325. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Povinelli, T.J. (1995). Review of What is intelligence? (Edited by Jean Kahlfa). Animal Behaviour, 50, 567-568. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1994). A theory of mind is in the head, not the heart. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 573-574. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1994). Comparative studies of mental state attribution: a reply to Heyes. Animal Behaviour, 48, 239-241. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & Godfrey, L.R. (1993). The chimpanzee's mind: How noble in reason? How absent of ethics? In (M. Nitecki & D. Nitecki, Eds.), pp. 277-324. Evolutionary Ethics. Albany, SUNY Press. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1994). How to create self-recognizing gorillas (but don't try it on macaques). In S. Parker, R. Mitchell & M. Boccia, Eds., Self-awareness in animals and humans, pp. 291-294. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1994). What chimpanzees (might) know about the mind. In Goodall, J., deWaal, F.B.M., & Wrangham, R., Eds., pp. 285-300. Chimpanzee Cultures, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. & deBlois, S. (1992). On (not) attributing mental states to monkeys: First, know thyself. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 164-166. [pdf]

Povinelli, D.J. (1985). Catastrophe without cause: Escaping the paradigmatic disadvantage. In R. Solt (Ed.), Debater’s Research Guide: Clarifying Water Policy, pp. 4-9. Winston-Salem, NC, Wake Forest University. [pdf